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This essay discusses how Schelling’s work up to 1809 gets appropriated and 
simplified by, but functions as a fifth column for, British Idealists interested 
in Naturphilosophie. Focusing on Coleridge (1772–1834) and his friend and 
executor, the Germanophile professor of anatomy and surgery, Joseph Henry 
Green (1791–1863), I explore the pressure the life sciences put on philosophy 
and the constraining of both by religious imperatives that are internal, conceptual 
censors, and external (cultural and institutional) censors. Though beyond my 
chronological parameters, Green’s protégé, Richard Owen (1804–1892), 
foremost biologist of the Victorian period before Darwin, is also relevant for 
idealist biology and transcendental anatomy. Unlike Kant and Hegel, Schelling 
remained virtually untranslated in nineteenth-century Britain, though he was 
taken up, and more diversely, in America. But Coleridge, Green, and Owen all 
read German, while Green and Owen also knew work by Cuvier and Carus. 
Green, a less complex and peripatetic and more public intellectual figure than 
Coleridge, met Coleridge in 1817 through Tieck; they read Schelling intensively 
in 1818 after Tieck arranged for Green to study German philosophy in Berlin with 
Solger in 1817; and for 10 years after Coleridge’s nervous turn against Schelling 
in 1818, they discussed issues arising from Naturphilosophie. Coleridge’s own 
interest in Schelling began in 1806, and despite later disavowals that when he 
credited Schelling with a ‘revolution in philosophy,’ he knew only the 
1800 System of Transcendental Idealism (STI), by 1816 he probably owned 11 
texts by Schelling.11. Coleridge, Notebooks, 2.2784; Biographia Literaria, 163; 
and ‘Friedrich Joseph Wilhelm von Schelling,’ 4.344.View all notes These 
spanned Naturphilosophie, transcendental philosophy, and religion and included 
the Freedom essay, and in the following years, Coleridge tried to acquire as 
much of Schelling’s work as possible.22. Coleridge, Collected Letters, 4.665.View 
all notes 
The Coleridgeans were drawn to German Idealism’s idea of nature as self-
developing but wanted to see a unity of plan in this process. This desideratum 
culminated in Owen’s adaptation of the vertebrate archetype from Carus, which 
allowed him to ‘personif[y]’ nature as advancing ‘from the first embodiment of the 
Vertebrate idea … [to] the Human form,’ ‘guided by the archetypal light.’33. 
Owen, On Limbs, 86.View all notesBut the tension between natural detail and 
divine plan is intimated in the ‘Recapitulatory Lecture’ for Green’s 1827 course on 
the medico-naturalist thinker John Hunter (1728–1793), where Green writes that 
a ‘history of nature’ may begin inductively with the ‘lowest,’ ‘nature,’ or 
deductively with the ‘highest’ or ‘First cause & ground of all,’ God.44. Green, 
‘Birds,’ 313; cf. His 1828 lecture in Vital Dynamics, 102–4.View all notes We will 
return to this history of nature that Green calls ‘physiogony’; but if nature is 
autogenetic, there is no guarantee where it may go. Hence, Schelling speaks of 
nature ‘evolv[ing] itself out of its own powers’ in a ‘terrible loneliness.’ Moreover, 
he sees a ‘polarity’ in the world-process, which is not a synthesis of opposites but 
a ‘duplicity’ and possible ‘diremption.’55. Schelling, Ages of the World, 104; 
and First Outline, 39, 139.View all notes Both Green and Coleridge recognize 
this diremption when they see ‘integration’ and ‘individuation’ as ‘polar forces’ in 
nature’s ‘evolution’ from the lowest to highest, since in individuation the ‘nisus of 
each detach[es] itself from the preceding or more imperfect States.’66. 
Coleridge, Theory of Life, 507, 515, 557; and Green, ‘Birds,’ 310.View all 
notes For if the higher detaches itself from the lower in what Schelling in his 
1799 First Outline (FO) calls the Stufenfolge or graduated stages of nature, the 
lower can also dis-integrate itself from the procession towards the higher. 
Each nisus can detach itself from the progress of ‘nature as subject’ or natura 
naturans,77. Schelling, First Outline, 17.View all notesforming objects or 
hypostases that may start new series that do not form part of an ascent. 
Put simply, unity of plan and biodiversity are incompatible. Hence, when the 
Coleridgeans took over Naturphilosophie’s conception of individual organisms 
and nature as self-organizing, they kept a ‘designing power’ for God.88. 
Richards, Romantic Conception, 518.View all notes They were supported in this 
by the legacy of the Cambridge Platonists, who posited a ‘plasticity’ in nature, but 
as a lower power that accounted for a certain blind or random variance under 
God’s distant oversight.99. Hunter, ‘Plastic Nature,’ 202–9.View all 
notes Significantly in his 1827 Hunterian lectures, Green had said that 
to deduce a history of nature was a branch of ‘Theology,’ which he wanted to 
keep separate from science. But in his 1828 lectures, on the edge of the 
Bridgewater Treatises commissioned in 1829 to reconcile the new sciences with 
natural theology, Green drops the bounding off of theology as well as any 
troublesome references to the ‘nisus’ of individuation.1010. Compare Green, 
‘Birds,’ 313 with Vital Dynamics, 102–5.View all notes By contrast, recognizing 
this power of individuation, which Leibniz also saw in the infinite divisibility of 
monads, Schelling says that within every ‘sphere other spheres are again 
formed, and in these spheres others.’ In terms of ‘Nature as subject,’ these 
‘individual products’ are ‘abortive attempts.’1111. Schelling, First Outline, 41, 41n, 
44.View all notesYet besides this ‘perspective … for the whole of organic nature,’ 
there is also one for the ‘individual,’ which Schelling feels compelled to ‘recover.’ 
To be sure, Nature perceives the individual’s ‘deviation’ as ‘disease,’ but as 
Schelling ironically adds, ‘life’ itself must then be a disease and a ‘state extorted 
from Nature.’1212. Ibid., 158–60, 160n.View all notes 
Schelling himself is torn between the universal and, particular, transcendental 
and natural philosophy. In STI, where nature is ‘the unconscious poetry’ of 
‘spirit,’1313. Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 12.View all 
notes nature’s autopoiesisresembles the artistry and ‘plastick’ power posited by 
Robinet and Cudworth to accommodate variance within a higher plan. But as 
Schelling gets into nature’s details, transcendental and natural philosophy cease 
to be ‘one science’ differentiated only by their ‘opposite orientation.’1414. 
Schelling, ‘Introduction to the Outline,’ 194.View all notes Coleridge himself 
recognizes that the very concept of self-organization enfolds a possible 
diremption of natural from transcendental philosophy, when he comments on the 
dangers of positing ‘an unconscious activity that acts intelligently without 
intelligence.’1515. Coleridge, ‘Friedrich Joseph Wilhelm von Schelling,’ 4.374.View 
all notes That Schelling was a plastic, protean thinker who opened these dangers 
is one reason Coleridge ends his Lectures on the History of Philosophy without 
discussing Schelling, complaining that he can be rhizomatically found in Kant, 
Spinoza, Plotinus, and Proclus, thus frustrating ‘a true account.’1616. 
Coleridge, History of Philosophy, 2.506, 588–90.View all notes Interestingly, 
Hegel also criticizes Schelling’s refusal to be reduced to a single system,1717. 
Hegel, History of Philosophy, 3.515.View all notes even as he ends his own 
history of philosophy with Schelling as the impossibility of concluding 
philosophy’s history. 
Yet paradoxically a simplified Schelling is used by British Idealism to give the life 
sciences philosophical weight, while inoculating them against the questions 
catalyzed by the feedback loop between science and philosophy. This involution 
of philosophy in science also has consequences for religion in 
the Freedom essay that disturb Coleridge, despite his high praise for this text in 
1812.1818. Coleridge, ‘Friedrich Joseph Wilhelm von Schelling,’ 4.402.View all 
notesFor unlike the more piecemeal twentieth-century reception of Schelling, 
Coleridge and Green saw that science, philosophy, politics, and religion form an 
architectonic in which different fields are so invisibly intertwined that unsettling 
one part destabilizes the whole edifice. The desired integration of different fields 
through a closed system of metaphoric transfers is apparent in the way Coleridge 
and his medical friends Green and John Abernethy adapt physiological to 
sociopolitical notions of ‘constitution,’ anxiously making the sciences of nature 
serve ‘spirit,’1919. Green, Vital Dynamics, xxii–iii.View all notes a term they could 
channel in secular directions without forfeiting its religious aura. Contrarily, the 
contamination with which other fields threaten religion is apparent in the 
Bridgewater treatises’ concerted plan of neutralizing multiple sciences, with an 
awareness that bio- and geo-diversity are homologous with polytheism, because 
they unsettle the idea of a single creation and unity of plan across species and 
ages.2020. Amundson, Changing Role of Embryo, 63–7.View all notes 
In the larger arc of British Idealism’s attempt to contain its more speculative, 
German counterpart and deploy it within this immunitary apparatus, there was a 
first (Romantic) phase dominated by Schelling and a second (Victorian) phase 
which selectively took up Hegel. Theorizing the ‘self-confuting logic’ of the 
immunitary apparatus, the contemporary philosopher Roberto Esposito suggests 
that in the nineteenth century there was a ‘dialectical circuit between political 
position and scientific research which projected conceptual references from one 
sphere onto the other.’ Through this ‘short-circuit’ (an example being the way 
‘constitution’ moves between Abernethy’s work on constitutional diseases and 
Coleridge’s On the Constitution of Church and State), ‘the “political body”’ closes 
‘within itself’ against its ‘outside,’2121. Esposito, Immunitas, 130, 147; and Bios, 
158.View all notes contracting the intellectual sphere as well. In the first phase, 
this short-circuit occurs through natural theology as a reconciliation of science 
and God deeply underwritten by political anxieties. But in the Coleridgeans’ 
attempt to synthesize natural philosophy and religion, Schelling proves 
a pharmakon. The result in the second phase is a forgetting of natural within 
political theology, through a turn to Hegel focalized through his logic and theory 
of the state rather than his aesthetics or philosophy of nature. 
Here it is worth mentioning the polymathic, though radically empirical, work of 
Hunter, who stands behind the urgency of dealing with nature in the first phase. 
Hunter was an encyclopedic thinker whose work spanned medicine, physiology, 
comparative anatomy, and geology: one who, in typically Romantic fashion, 
wanted to create a system but held back from publication and definitive 
organization. In scope if not style his work rivals the more theoretical projects of 
Hegel and Schelling in traversing all knowledge in the life sciences. In 1799, the 
Crown purchased his collection of fossils and healthy and diseased body parts, 
and the life sciences thus became a national trust, resulting in the Hunterian 
Museum at the Royal College of Surgeons, Hunterian lecture series, and 
‘orations’ on Hunter’s birthday. To complicate matters, though much of Hunter’s 
medico-physiological work was collected and published (but not till 1835), his 
brother-in-law Sir Everard Home burned Hunter’s notes on the specimens in 
1823. The general view is that Home plagiarized the work, but he himself said he 
wanted to protect Hunter from charges of irreligion. In this vacuum, ‘Hunter’ 
became a metonym for the problem of how to manage life: practically, by 
considering the past and future of British medicine, or intellectually, by organizing 
his work to resolve the insidious question of what constitutes life. Those who 
wanted to see Hunter’s empiricism not as materialism but as demonstrating 
some kind of ‘spirit,’ organized and theorized his work according to a combination 
of Cuvierian taxonomy and the graduated stages of nature. Though 
the Stufenfolge was not unique to Idealism, Schelling’s development of it was 
crucial to Hunter’s philosophical interpreters. 
Coleridge is the most interesting here but plays a hidden role, as his Theory of 
Life (TL), written much earlier,2222. The date usually assumed is 1816–1817, but 
McFarland (2002McFarland, T. ‘Prolegomena’ to S.T. Coleridge, Opus 
Maximum. Edited by Thomas McFarland. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2002. [Google Scholar]) argues that TLwas written in 1819 
(‘Prolegomena,’ ccviii–ix).View all notes was not published till 1848. More in the 
forefront are Green, who gave Hunterian lectures and orations, and Owen, also a 
High Church man, who was hired to arrange the collection, becoming sole 
Hunterian lecturer in 1837.2323. For the religious and political affiliations of Green, 
Owen and the ‘Germano–Coleridgeans’ see Desmond, The Politics of Evolution, 
26–75, 352–72.View all notes Hunter’s work crystallized on the British scene the 
threat posed by the life sciences to religion and was the object of fierce debates 
over ‘life,’ notably the contention between Abernethy and the materialist William 
Lawrence which sparked Coleridge’s text. Yet there is little in Hunter to support 
an ascent of man where nature gradually sheds the counter-memory or 
phylogenetic traces of lower organisms, and in FO Schelling only writes this idea 
under erasure. Though Hunter pre-dates Schelling, Schelling knew his work, and 
just as Naturphilosophie proved a thorn in the flesh of transcendental philosophy, 
Hunter was a fifth column in British science.2424. See Rajan, ‘Asystasy,’ for 
elaboration, as well as discussion of how Hunter and Schelling can be 
connected.View all notesAmong the concerns he shares with the Germans is an 
interest in the self-organization of life as it develops from matter in a process that 
has no clear evolutionary line and an uncertain sense of the relation between 
matter and ‘spirit’ (as the name for a vital principle that is obscure, ungrounded, 
and aleatory). Related to this is his sense that normal and pathological life 
processes may be entwined, evidence for which lies in his many surgical case 
studies, where life and mortification come perilously close. In the appendix on 
disease in Schelling’s FO and the last section of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature, 
we find a similar proximity between disease and life that imperils the movement 
from nature to spirit. Nor does Hunter’s physiology support the graduated series 
of ‘powers’ and ‘functions’ that Schelling and Coleridge wanted to find in 
bodies.2525. Schelling, First Outline, 149, 159; and Coleridge, Theory of Life, 495, 
526.View all notes Moreover, in general Hunter’s work on the body’s ramifying 
subsystems, paralleled in Schelling’s physiology in FO, forces us to rethink the 
tangled nature of systems, raising problems for the all-encompassing intellectual 
system that Coleridge sought in German Idealism2626. Coleridge, Collected 
Letters, 4.667.View all notes: problems mirrored in Coleridge’s attempts to criss-
cross innumerable fields of knowledge in his Notebooks. 
Green uses Schelling expediently to contain Hunter, but together they make an 
explosive cocktail. Hunter gives empirical depth to Schelling’s ‘tormented 
idealism,’2727. Krell, Contagion, 24.View all notes while Schelling helps to phrase 
philosophically the issues raised by Hunter’s radical empiricism. Thus in British 
Idealism’s second phase, it becomes easier to turn to a rationalized Hegel, 
purged of his philosophy of nature, which was left untranslated till 1970.2828. 
William Wallace translated Parts 1 and 3 of the Encyclopedia (1873, 1894) but 
not the Philosophy of Nature. Twentieth-century translations of the three Jena 
systems also scrupulously omit the sections on nature.View all notes Of note 
here is work by Stirling, McTaggart, Caird, Bosanquet, and others. In this phase, 
Schelling is still read (and indeed Oken and Oersted were translated), but his 
volatile Naturphilosophie is firmly contained as a ‘subordinate or applied 
department’ of ‘transcendental philosophy’ by commentators like John Watson 
who exported British Idealism to Canada.2929. Watson, Schelling’s 
Transcendental Idealism, 92.View all notes Indeed, Naturphilosophie becomes a 
way of marginalizing Schelling, as the Hegelian state could realize spirit more 
safely. Just as the state and ethics close off the dangers of Naturphilosophie, 
Hegel’s logic is used to resist the existential and esoteric tendencies of the late 
Schelling, whose religion was insufficiently allied with civil society. That ‘Hegel’ 
becomes more respectable for Anglo-American philosophy in the long run should 
not distract us from their early continuity in the mission of British Idealism. For as 
natural theology mutates into political theology, Hegel does the figural work 
intended for ‘Schelling,’ only better, because he has been better streamlined. 
For Esposito, ‘political-theology,’ or what Carl Schmitt discerns as the 
persistence of theological structures in modernity, is part of the social body’s self-
protective immunitary apparatus. These structures, including the corporation of a 
college like the RCS, considered as ‘a collective person’ or ‘legal body’ in which 
power passes uninterruptedly from Father to Son, survive so invisibly in 
discourses and institutions that one is unaware of being incorporated in their 
‘web.’ Consequently, though theology and secularization seem opposed, the two 
remain within ‘the same horizon.’ The isomorphism of the political and theological 
works bilaterally, as theology determines and is determined by the political and 
its domains: class, structures of authority and thought, and hierarchies of mental 
faculties and academic fields. British Idealism’s turn to Hegel because he was 
more modern exemplifies this rechannelling of theological into politico-intellectual 
structures that do not give up a hidden religious validation. This transfer, as 
Esposito suggests, occurred more efficiently in Protestantism, which had 
preserved theology as political theology, than in Catholicism which had to 
undergo a ‘tragic revolutionary break’ to enter modernity, exposing the ‘aporetic’ 
way that politics and theology are ‘bound together’ in dis-correspondence.3030. 
Esposito, Two, 3, 23–24, 33, 54–5, 77.View all notes Doubtless this is why the 
mid-Victorian wave of British Idealism, though in some cases theologically 
centered, never took up the late Schelling. For although political theology was in 
play in Schelling’s appointment to Hegel’s chair, Schelling’s work from 
the Freedom essay onwards revolves around this dis-correspondence, where 
philosophy and religion are each used to think the other from the outside. 
Green is a neglected figure in the transition within British Idealism. For it was he 
who laid the basis for Germano–Coleridgean thought as a political theology by 
passing on his mantle to Owen and constructing a clerisy with Coleridge as 
Father in subtitling his last book as ‘founded’ on the master’s ‘teaching.’ 
Spanning the Romantic and Victorian periods, Green also effects 
the Aufhebung of natural into political theology. Green gave the Hunterian 
lectures from 1824–1828, but it was not till 1840 that he published Vital 
Dynamics, a retrospect which combined his Oration of that year with earlier 
papers, including the last (1828) version of the ‘Recapitulatory Lecture’ for his 
courses, which forms the basis of his Oration. Vital Dynamics is followed by 
Green’s second Hunterian Oration, Mental Dynamics (1847), and then the 
posthumous Spiritual Philosophy (1865), edited by his pupil, which brings 
Coleridge’s ‘teaching’ to the threshold of British Idealism’s second phase. 
Green knew the work of Kant, Schelling, and Carus. But since he went to Berlin 
in the year Solger helped appoint Hegel and owned a copy of the Logic, he may 
also have had some knowledge of Hegel. An attenuated Hegelian influence is 
suggested by the fact that the movement from nature to spirit enacted 
between Vital and Mental Dynamics is more Hegelian than Schellingian. To be 
sure the transition is titular, since Mental Dynamics has little to do with 
psychology or any other ‘philosophical’ sciences. Also reminiscent of Hegel is 
Green’s interest in an encyclopedic Bildung that traverses all the disciplines, 
since Mental Dynamics combines the Idealist program with 
the trivium and quadriviumto outline a general curriculum for the education of a 
medical clerisy. Again, Green’s orientation is pragmatic, not speculative, as he 
(perhaps) added on a simplified Hegel to a Platonised Schelling.3131. See 
Green, Vital Dynamics, xxi.View all notes 
Vital Dynamics aims to recognize Hunter as a ‘philosophical physiologist’ in a 
Kantian sense and thus to elevate the life sciences into philosophical sciences 
with higher aims than the pragmatic ones emphasized by other orators.3232. Ibid., 
v–ix, xiv–xv.View all notes For this purpose, Green invokes the ‘dynamic’ 
philosophy of the Germans and specifically Schelling. Alluding to FO, which he 
read with Coleridge, Green elides its complexity by glossing it through Schelling’s 
more transcendentally idealist comments, in On University Studies, on 
comparative anatomy as the unity and affinity of all organisms.3333. Ibid., 
38n.View all notes Crucial to Green’s organization of scientific knowledge is the 
schema of physiography, physiology, and physiogony which he used in two of his 
lecture series. Physiography is mere natural history or natura naturata. 
Physiology studies the ‘laws,’ ‘powers,’ and ‘forces’ common to ‘living bodies’ and 
is natura naturans since, although Green omits plants from his Naturphilosophie, 
he does evoke ‘Nature’ in a general sense. Though Green saw his lectures as 
mainly physiographical, it is physiology that moves beyond phenomena, making 
biology a philosophical and not just empirical science. But the third and most 
important mode is physiogony, which projects Nature ‘as an agent, acting under 
the analogy of a will,’ thus making the jump from purposiveness to teleology. 
Physiogony studies how nature ‘labours in birth with man,’ working up from 
‘the polypi to the mammalia,’ and making nature a ‘preface and portion of the 
history of man,’ and ‘branch of self-knowledge.’ Its ‘History of Nature’ is a series 
of Aufhebungen, which allows us to discover in the past, as ‘so many embryonic 
states of the organism,’ the ‘solution of the present, and in both the anticipation of 
the future.’3434. Ibid., 101–4.View all notes 
Green gets two of his terms from Kant, but Kant’s use of physiogony in a footnote 
is inconsequential. More relevant is Schelling, who complains that 
Kant’s Naturgeschichte is a mere Naturbeschreibung. Schelling thus wants to 
give ‘natural history’ ‘a much higher meaning,’ that of a ‘history of Nature [eine 
Geschichte der Natur selbst].’ Hence his teleological hypothesis of 
the Stufenfolge whereby Nature ‘brings forth the whole multiplicity of its products 
through continuous deviations from a common ideal’ which it realizes ‘in the 
whole’ rather than the ‘individual.’3535. Schelling, First Outline, 53; for a fuller 
discussion see Rajan, ‘Evolution and its Resistances,’ 161–2.View all 
notes Green specifically responds to Schelling when he describes ‘Natural 
History’ as ‘a misnomer, an erratum in the nomenclature of science,’3636. 
Green, Vital Dynamics, 107.View all notes naming a new science, physiogony, to 
ground the analogy of nature and spirit as an evolutionary sequence. Coleridge 
makes a similar comment on the day Green first theorized physiogony in his 
1827 ‘Recapitulatory Lecture.’ But otherwise, Coleridge’s use of physiogony is 
theological and not natural-historical, and he does not put it into a disciplinary 
series including physiography and physiology.3737. Coleridge, Notebooks, 
5.5478, 5489, 5510, 5518, 5522.View all notes It seems, then, that Green is 
responsible for naming this new science. For not only is Green more teleo-
theological than Schelling, and not only does he hypostatize Schelling’s 
speculation, using it to narrativize Hunter, whose work is more like the networks 
of fields in the Outline itself. Throughout Vital Dynamics, Green also simplifies 
and streamlines Coleridge, to make natural theology the foundation of political 
theology. Thus where Coleridge sees the two tendencies in nature’s evolution – 
individuation and integration – as polar forces, Green synthesizes them.3838. 
Coleridge, Theory of Life, 515; and Green, Vital Dynamics, 38–9.View all 
notes And it is Green, more than Coleridge, who directs Abernethy’s work on 
constitutional diseases towards political and social constitution,3939. Green, Vital 
Dynamics, xxii–iii.View all notes making explicit the political theology that had 
always underlain natural theology. 
In the light of Mental Dynamics, Vital Dynamics seems a retrospect that 
organizes the life sciences to move beyond them. This recapitulation is possible 
because it distills Green’s previous work without the details of his lectures from 
the 1820s. Green’s evocations of Idealism, anglicized under the cloak of ‘Hunter,’ 
are similarly schematic. Where in Hegel’s Encyclopedia nature keeps returning in 
the sciences of spirit (anthropology and psychology), Mental Dynamics focuses 
on education, not philosophy. Recapitulation in biology is a deeply economic 
concept, sparing nature from having to go through all the stages again in each 
individual organism, and sparing thought from what Coleridge calls 
‘incipien[ce].’4040. Coleridge, Notebooks, 4.4517.View all notes Coleridge is more 
fraught, the key text being TL, published without the knowledge of Green, who 
might not have wanted to represent Coleridge by anything unsystematic.4141. 
McFarland, ‘Prolegomena,’ cxlv–vi.View all notesWhile commentators assume 
Green did not know TL,4242. Levere, however, suggests Coleridge revised TL in 
conjunction with Green’s 1824 Hunterian lectures (Poetry Realized in Nature, 
44–5).View all notes Vital Dynamics responds so closely to it that it seems rather 
a silent natural-theological correction of Coleridge. 
Coleridge is more complex. His reading of Schelling was ambitiously 
interdisciplinary but is best known for his borrowings from STI in Biographia 
Literaria (BL). According to Orsini what attracted Coleridge in BL was Schelling’s 
‘inclusion of nature in the system of absolute mind’: his ‘dynamic philosophy,’ 
which repudiated ‘realism’ by making nature ‘unawakened mind’ and mind 
‘nature that has achieved’ self-consciousness.4343. Orsini, Coleridge and German 
Idealism, 198–200.View all notes But the texts supporting this reading – STI and 
the 1799 Introduction to the Outline – do not represent the Naturphilosophie, as 
Schelling worked simultaneously with multiple possible systems, this radical 
openness being the ‘freedom’ he confers on the ‘absolute subject’ in his Erlangen 
Lectures.4444. Schelling, ‘Nature of Philosophy,’ 217–20.View all notes Though 
this seems unrecognized by Coleridgeans, FO and its Introduction are radically 
different texts: the latter is a supplement published after the text it introduces and 
tries to put what Hegel describes as nature’s ‘ever-increasing wealth of detail’ 
which is ‘recalcitrant to the Unity of the Notion’ back into a system of identity.4545. 
Hegel, Philosophy of Nature, 444.View all notes As such, its desired 
correspondence of natural and transcendental philosophy is hypothetical. Indeed, 
when Schelling says in FO that to ‘philosophize about nature means as much as 
to create it,’ this is no statement of correlationist idealism, but indicates that 
everything is in construction, or that there are no Kantian a priori categories of 
mind. Mind is a fold in nature, and as it thinks about nature, the forms that mind 
takes are created by new forms in which nature causes it to think. But this can 
happen only if mind constructs a nature that is itself in ‘configuration,’ for it would 
be ‘impossible to get a glimpse of the internal construction of Nature’ if we did not 
attempt a speculative ‘invasion … through freedom,’ as a ‘question put to Nature’ 
to which it responds.4646. Schelling, First Outline, 5–6; and ‘Introduction to the 
Outline,’ 196–7.View all notes It is in this doubly constructivist sense, and not in 
the conventional sense of identity assumed by Coleridgean commentators, that 
Schelling says ‘the system of nature’ is simultaneously ‘the system of our 
mind.’4747. Schelling, Ideas, 30.View all notes 
For Schelling transcendental and natural philosophy are potencies of each other, 
quantitatively different, perhaps also qualitatively, but not in a hierarchical way. 
Coleridge, by contrast, is a dualist. Or he is uncertainly a monist in the 
locodescriptive poetry and scientific prose (including letters) which are his 
equivalent of the Naturphilosophie, but a dualist in his need to reassert a higher 
term: God, mind, or imagination. Thus in BL, the primary imagination or 
perception is a ‘repetition’ in the human mind of the ‘eternal act of creation in the 
infinite I AM’ whose self-grounding is mirrored in a Fichtean I that Coleridge calls 
will, while the secondary or aesthetic imagination is an ‘echo’ of the primary. Lest 
even this schema of emanation rather than potencies veer too close to the 
monism that is also what draws him to the dynamic philosophy, Coleridge then 
asserts an absolute dualism between imagination as vital and fancy as 
mechanical, and between imagination and the ‘objects’ it ‘struggles’ to idealize 
and unify, which are ‘fixed and dead.’4848. Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, 304–
5.View all notes This division between organic and inorganic would be 
unthinkable for Schelling. The theory of imagination implodes because it cannot 
hold the poles of a dynamic philosophy and an immunitary dualism together. 
Nevertheless, the common wisdom accepts Coleridge’s own ingenuous 
explanation that when writing BL he was misled by having read only STI, 
otherwise Schelling himself would have put him ‘on guard.’4949. 
Coleridge, Collected Letters, 4.874.View all notes Yet we know that by 1812 he 
had also read the Freedom essay. When Coleridge later read Schelling 
intensively with Green in 1818, he supposedly rethought his earlier, undigested 
enthusiasm, whether it was Schelling’s particularly volatile idealism or 
his Naturphilosophie that stirred Coleridge’s religious anxieties. Writing to Green, 
he commented that ‘as soon as [Schelling] commenced the Objective or Natur-
wissenschaft, he gave the Slip’ to the I Am and in ‘his Jarbücher der Medicin 
fairly involved it’ in the It Is, leaving ‘both in the Lurch.’5050. Ibid., 4.874.View all 
notes At this point, even the transcendental philosophy that seemed so 
‘revolution[ary]’ in BL5151. Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, 163.View all notes was 
bothering Coleridge, as he sensed that it contained its own unravelling into 
nature. Thus in new marginalia on the Introduction to the Outline, he takes aim at 
Schelling’s claim that transcendental and natural philosophy are ‘one science, 
differentiated only by the opposing orientations of their tasks.’5252. Schelling, 
‘Introduction to the Outline,’ 194.View all notes He sees Schelling’s ‘unconscious 
activity that acts intelligently without intelligence’ as a contradiction, accusing him 
of not distinguishing ‘primary’ from ‘secondary’ or ‘reflective consciousness.’5353. 
Coleridge, ‘Friedrich Joseph Wilhelm von Schelling,’ 4.374.View all notes Of 
course this is the point of FO’s extraordinary experiment in grasping nature as 
pure primary process, which can be done only through a reflective invasion that 
is itself reconfigured by this process. 
What concerns Coleridge even in the transcendental philosophy is that if nature 
is immanently self-organizing, if nature develops into intelligence rather than 
under its direction, then mind too risks becoming autogenetic and escaping the 
control of a higher term. Put differently, Schelling’s notion of dynamic evolution is 
oriented to growth, and this growth and the growth of the mind it opens up (to 
evoke Wordsworth) threaten to unbalance the argument from design. Coleridge 
thus reacts against ‘making Nature absolute.’ He further complains that Schelling 
does not posit a ‘genesis’ of matter and motion (and thus a divine origin) but 
assumes ‘the eternity of the material universe’ in ‘a succession which is it’s [sic] 
own predecessor’; consequently ‘God is not self-sufficing … not GOD, but a part 
of the universe, nay a product of the same. This indeed Schelling has dared 
assert in his Denkmal.’ Put differently, Schelling introduces ‘polarity’ into the 
‘unity of a perfect Will’ or ‘Godhead,’ polarity being not the expansive and 
contracting drives in nature that Schelling often evokes, but the philosophical 
poles of ‘Transcendental Idealism … and Nature.’5454. Coleridge, Notebooks, 
3.4449; and Collected Letters, 4.873–4.View all notes This bi-polar God and the 
bi-polar mind needed to comprehend him, go far beyond any comfortable 
pantheism of the ‘One Life,’ making God a ‘life,’ ‘subject to suffering and 
becoming.’5555. Schelling, Freedom, 66.View all notes 
Coleridge’s critique goes to the heart of Schelling’s work which, in turning to the 
‘ideal part’ of philosophy in the Freedom essay,5656. Ibid., 4.View all 
notes performs a reverse Aufhebung that makes the philosophy of nature a 
feedback loop which involves the very ground of philosophy in its ungrounding. 
Green chose to ignore this detailed reading of Schelling in the higher service of 
inventing a philosophical authority to contain the religious threat posed by the life 
sciences. But we should not too decisively use Coleridge’s ill-tempered letter to 
Green about the ‘rotten parts’ and ‘vacua’ of Schelling’s ‘foundation’ to construct 
Coleridge’s thinking in the same clear line. Coleridge turned against Fichte and 
then returned to the bulwark Fichte provided.5757. Coleridge, Collected Letters, 
4.793, 873–5.View all notes His speculative waverings around ‘Schelling’ are 
rhizomatically threaded through letters and notebooks as well as the persona he 
adopted in published work that uses political theology to put fences around 
natural philosophy: namely Aids to Reflection and Church and State. Coleridge 
does indeed grow more critical of Schelling, and commentators like Raimonda 
Modiano have therefore seen him as completing his own very different system or, 
in Paul Hamilton’s intriguing argument, the system of which the Schelling of the 
positive philosophy was in search.5858. Modiano, Coleridge, 160, 186–204; and 
Hamilton, Coleridge and German Philosophy, 122–3.View all notes But 
‘Schelling’ is better seen as a space for projecting, disavowing, yet secretly 
holding onto solutions and irresolvable issues about the relationship among 
idealism, nature, and religion. 
For there is nothing systematic about Coleridge, whose notebooks exemplify 
Schelling’s claim that the desire for a system indicates that knowledge ‘does not 
exist in a system’ but is an ‘asystaton,’ ‘in inner conflict.’ Schelling may want to 
overcome this asystasy in unity, but also argues that this ‘irresolvable’ conflict 
must be ‘developed in every possible direction,’ which means that a ‘truly free 
philosophy’ has to ‘leave everything,’ even ‘God.’5959. Schelling, ‘Nature of 
Philosophy,’ 213, 217.View all notes Clearly this would not suit Coleridge. Yet the 
fact that Coleridge wrote an essay on scrofula at the same time as the 
vitalist TL mirrors both Schelling’s inclusion of an Appendix on disease alongside 
the Stufenfolge in FO, and the similar problems about vitality and (de)generation 
raised by Hunter’s corpus. Nor does Coleridge overcome this duality, as he 
continues to read and translate German medical texts while writing Church and 
State. Thus I suggest that Schelling’s asystasy is the underside of Coleridge’s 
political theology. The nervous structure of the oxymoron ‘political theology’ can 
be seen in Coleridge’s early poem ‘The Eolian Harp,’ which flirts with pantheism, 
admittedly a simple pantheism that imagines a pre-established harmony in ‘all of 
animated nature’ (l.44), and not the ontologically devastating exposure of ‘God’ to 
finitude we find in Schelling’s Freedom essay. At the end, Coleridge invokes a 
higher term to close off his ‘vain Philosophy’ (l.57), or rather an ambiguously 
gendered placeholder for this authority, his wife, whom he addresses as ‘Meek 
daughter in the family of Christ.’ (l.53). The awkward language suggests 
Coleridge’s uncertain relationship to this ‘family’ that is both required and stifling 
and indeed suggests Coleridge’s precarious participation in all the families he 
would construct: personal, scientific, and theological. 
A similar misfit between framing and content drives TL which, though 
unpublished, continues to worry Coleridge’s thinking with the aporias of 
Schelling’s work. Coleridge was drawn to German thought because of its 
‘Encyclopedic Breadth,’ and even in mid-1818 saw Schelling as unifying 
subjective and objective poles. That this project may be ‘too ambitious’6060. 
Coleridge, Collected Letters, 4.667, 792, 863.View all notes is the sign that 
encyclopedic breadth is precisely what opens up an unavoidable asystasy. 
German thought spurred Coleridge to imagine his own organization of 
knowledge, which in mid-1818 he rethought as a ‘descent’ from Theology, 
through Ethics and Logic, to Zoology and Physics.6161. Ibid., 4.864.View all 
notes But the hints towards an organization of knowledge in TL take the more 
Idealist form of an ‘ascent’: a form based on Schelling’s Stufenfolge and used by 
Hegel to anchor an ascent of disciplines. In TL Coleridge, while tracing nature’s 
evolution from inorganic to organic and from polypi to mammalia also gestures 
towards an epistemic ascent through the corresponding disciplines of physics, 
geology, and physiology. In an uncanny coincidence with Hegel, each science 
forms a ‘circle’ that is an ‘arc’ or ‘station’ in the ‘absolute science of Life,’ from 
whence begins a ‘new series beyond … physiology’6262. Coleridge, Theory of 
Life, 516, 519n, 551.View all notes: what Schelling calls the ideal as opposed to 
real series. The issue of ascent vs. descent is that of an immanently unfolding 
development vs. a transcendentally guaranteed deduction of both life and 
knowledge. 
At the heart of TL is what Schelling calls the Stufenfolge, by which nature 
organizes itself in an ascending scale of complexity, through ‘continuous 
deviations’ from the ‘ideal,’ but as ‘one organism [Organisation] inhibited at 
various stages.’6363. Schelling, First Outline, 43, 53.View all notes This dynamic 
evolution is an adaptation of the more static hierarchy of classes in the Chain of 
Being, but for both Schelling and Coleridge, it is an ‘idea,’ and not the actual 
biological evolution envisioned by either Darwin.6464. Ibid., 49.View all notes The 
immediate occasion for TLwas the Abernethy–Lawrence debate over religion vs. 
science, focalized through Hunter’s work. The Museum contained everything 
from fossils to preserved parts of living creatures, thus opening the porous 
borders between organisms of which man is only one species. Responding to 
this array which was still being organized in the 1830s, Coleridge asks what ‘life’ 
is, answering this question both physiologically and physiogonically, in Green’s 
later terminology. Physiologically, Coleridge concurs with Hunter that life cannot 
consist in organization, which may precede it but is merely mechanical. But 
where Hunter decouples life and organization, making the vital principle 
something aleatory and unspecified, for Coleridge organization also remains a 
minimal condition of qualitative life: a crystal is superior to an amoeba. It is this 
which leads to his strong emphasis on ‘individuation’ as the combining of parts 
into a whole, but within a ‘progressive’ ‘ladder’ of being or ‘gradative evolution,’ 
Green’s term for the Stufenfolge which anchors his physiogony.6565. 
Coleridge, Theory of Life, 510, 533; and Green, Vital Dynamics, 39.View all notes 
But Coleridge has difficulty with this paradigm that tries to immunize a normative 
‘nature’ against a ‘life’ that, for Schelling, exceeds it.6666. Schelling, First Outline, 
62, 160n.View all notes For in nature’s proliferating details, the corals and polypi 
complicate the ascent from vegetation to animalization necessary to 
individuation. Indeed, Coleridge cannot put vegetation and animalization in a 
sequence and sends them in different, branching directions; yet they also meet in 
the corals and polypi, confusing what he wants to separate.6767. 
Coleridge, Theory of Life, 538–9.View all notes Nor does the increasing 
complexity of organisms align with their increasing integration, as Green knew it 
must do for physiological constitution to provide an argument from design that 
supports the health of the body politic. For the body’s subsystems threaten the 
balance between individuation and integration. Thus in 1822, Coleridge writes of 
the relations of ‘the different parts of the Body’ to the ‘nervous system’ and ‘the 
nerves themselves to the Brain’ and says that ‘the polypus nature of every nerve’ 
means that each part not only has ‘relations to its centre’ but is ‘a center in itself.’ 
It seems then that the human body is a ‘network’ of hyperindividuations rather 
than a ‘graduated series of functions.’6868. Coleridge, Notebooks, 4.4865; 
and Theory of Life, 539.View all notes For Schelling too, it proves impossible to 
achieve this graduated series of functions fused into ‘ONE force,’ as the body 
ramifies into ‘individual systems of specialized excitability’ that make 
‘organization’ an ‘involution’ of ‘system within system.’6969. Schelling, First 
Outline, 127, 141, 149.View all notes 
Hunter is supposed to resolve these problems, and contemporaries tried to 
narrativize his cabinet of curiosities as a natural history museum that 
demonstrates the Stufenfolge. But there is no naturalized theodicy in Hunter’s 
empiricism, which led him to collect as many diverse, mutant specimens of life as 
he could. Coleridge therefore turns from the Museum to Hunter’s ‘writings’ to 
‘guid[e]’ him towards the ‘unity of the Creator.’ But these writings are full of 
‘obscurities’ and ‘contradictions.’ Indeed, Hunter’s physiology presents a network 
of nerves, blockages, and anastomoses that figures the very structure of his 
writings. So two years later, in the Essays on ‘Method,’ Coleridge turns back from 
writings where Hunter never found ‘the compleating Word’ to the Museum, 
where, absolved from language, he constructed the ‘idea’ for ‘scientific 
apprehension out of the alphabet of nature.’7070. Coleridge, Theory of Life, 586; 
and The Friend, 1.474, 474n1.View all notes This mystification, and the 
hermeneutic circling between the writings and Museum as supplements to each 
other, exposes Hunter as an inadequate prosthesis, sustained by what others 
projected onto him.7171. Coleridge could not have read much by Hunter on life. 
The published work available by 1816–1819 was on gunshot wounds, venereal 
disease, and teeth but not comparative anatomy. Coleridge probably had an 
impression of Hunter’s theories from John Abernethy, who sanitized him for his 
own purposes. Even organization of the Museum did not begin in earnest till 
1823.View all notes Thus, the ‘august temple’ of Hunter’s corpus resembles 
nothing more than the ‘Gothic cathedral’ Coleridge uses to figure his own half-
unwritten theory of imagination in the contemporaneous BL. While TL was simply 
not published, in BLColeridge actually published a letter from a ‘friend’ advising 
him not to publish his theory.7272. Coleridge, Theory of Life, 586; and Biographia 
Literaria, 300–4.View all notes This curious subterfuge draws attention to the 
deferral of publication as a way of writing under erasure. Schelling enters both 
these texts as a zone of disavowal, openings, and untraversed difficulties. For 
the infamous plagiarisms in both texts are a way for Coleridge not to put in his 
own words a unifying idealism that cannot be grounded in Schelling either. 
Plagiarism holds together in a bipolar short-circuit a simultaneous enthusiasm for 
and doubt about this unity. 
In TL as Hunter proves inadequate, Schelling and Naturphilosophie are 
introduced to support the One Life. But again, Schelling is a hypotyposis, and the 
fact that he is nowhere mentioned intimates an anxiety about the Pandora’s box 
he might open: a danger intrinsic to any idealism that wants to be a realism. Yet 
Schelling is throughout the text in the language of indifference and polarity, which 
continues in Coleridge’s work well after 1816. More specifically FO is in the 
background of TL and is particularly unsettling to any pure idealism because it 
goes beyond the still abstract dynamic physics of Ideas for a Philosophy of 
Nature and takes up the history of nature as the complex (de)construction of this 
very idea of a history. Though Coleridgeans only discuss the Introduction and 
never FO, it was bound and annotated with the former in the copy Coleridge 
read. It enters TL in the tension between a ‘positive’ force of ‘attachment or 
reduction’ into the universal life and a force of ‘detachment’: a ‘negative’ and 
‘limitative power, constantly acting to individualize’ and ‘figure the former.’ The 
striking word ‘figure,’ which is central to FO, is worth noting.7373. 
Coleridge, Theory of Life, 515, 557; and Notebooks, 3.4449. If Coleridge did 
indeed write TL in 1819 (see note 22 above), he would just have been re-
reading FO.View all notes Finally, of all Schelling’s texts, it is FO that most fully 
works through the Stufenfolge. 
For although Schelling does touch on the Stufenfolge in STI,7474. 
Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 122–6.View all notes in making it 
a preface and portion of the history of spirit, he avoids the conceptual and 
material details in FO that complicate this history, which are everywhere 
in TL and the Notebooks long after 1818. Importantly, in FO, Schelling cannot 
ground the Stufenfolge. Though it is his favored system, it is only one of many 
possible systems, unsettled by his ‘dynamic atomism,’ his uncertainty about the 
role of chemistry, and his volatile physiology described above. At the center 
of FO is the tension between the ‘universal organism’ of nature and the individual 
which is a ‘limit to its activity,’ which nature ‘labours to destroy.’ ‘Individual 
natures’ that detach themselves from a gradative evolution are ‘misbegotten 
attempts,’ even while this ‘separation’ of botched products from the world-
process is necessary for deducing the Stufenfolge, since without it these entities 
would not be ‘permanent’ and thus discernible as individual stages.7575. 
Schelling, First Outline, 35, 39–41, 53–4.View all notes But since Coleridge, 
more than Schelling, also makes individuation the motor of the Stufenfolge, it 
seems that the individuation which forwards dynamic evolution holds it back, as 
individual natures develop independently, resisting the will in nature. Coleridge 
tries to avoid this problem by positing something like a Hegelian Aufhebung to 
theorize a logical evolution that simulates a material evolution. Discussing the 
superiority of fish to insects, he also discerns an inferiority in their mode of 
impregnation and concludes that every ‘grade of ascension’ is accompanied by 
‘an apparent retrograde movement’ but that when nature ‘drops a faculty’ she 
always ‘pick[s] it up’ again at a higher level.7676. Coleridge, Theory of Life, 546–
8.View all notes Thus ‘in the idea of each power, the lower derives 
it’s intelligibility from the higher,’ while ‘each higher implies a lower in order to it’s 
actual existence [sic].’ In a fragment on ‘The Scale of Life,’ he also writes that 
‘parts are seen’ whose ‘full purpose’ is ‘realized higher up in the scale,’ so that 
the higher finds its ‘history’ in the lower which is a ‘vita uterina,’ ‘prophetical’ of 
the higher.7777. Coleridge, Collected Letters, 6.597–8; and Scale of Life, 
1194.View all notes 
Yet the details of the Stufenfolge unsettle the paradigm. This complication also 
disturbs any ‘Stufenfolge’ of the ‘Wissenschaften,’7878. This is Schelling’s phrase 
in ‘Vorlesungen’ (261). The English translation in On University Studies (55) is 
imprecise.View all notes hence the idea does not appear in later published work, 
which only discusses the relation between life and organization.7979. 
Coleridge, History of Philosophy, 2.524–5.View all notes Hence also why a 
‘descent’ of the disciplines from Theology seemed safer than an ascent in 1818, 
and why in the Encyclopedia Metropolitana, which was completed by others 
including F.D. Maurice, the volumes follow an ascent through the sciences of 
spirit, followed by a descent into those of nature, and then an array of other 
fields.8080. Coleridge dissociated himself from EM, re-publishing his Introduction 
as the Essays on Method in The Friend. However, it is not the arrangement of 
volumes that annoyed him, but their mixed systematic-alphabetic arrangement, 
which brought EM closer to the Encyclopedia Britannicawhich it was supposed to 
counter.View all notes The Metropolitana was a conservative reaction not only 
against the more modern Encyclopédie and Encyclopedia Britannica, but also 
against the Idealist encyclopedics of Hegel, Schelling, and Novalis. But in 
unpublished work from 1822–1828, Coleridge remained fascinated by an ascent 
of life, whose problematic nature made letters, fragments, and notebooks the 
appropriate place for his protean speculations. As a philosopher of science, 
Coleridge wanted ‘evolution as contra-distinguished from apposition, or 
superinduction ab aliunde.’8181. Coleridge, Collected Letters, 6.599.View all 
notes In the process, he was sensitive to the fact that life could behave 
pathologically as well as normally, and less inclined than Abernethy and Green to 
bracket disease as an aberration from health. That Coleridge wrote an essay on 
scrofula alongside the vitalist TL mirrors Schelling’s inclusion of an Appendix on 
disease alongside the Stufenfolge in FO, whose devastating consequences for 
freedom Krell outlines.8282. Krell, Contagion, 74–6, 94, 112–14.View all notes 
Returning to the disciplines, the problem posed by a descent is that it is, finally, 
‘superinduction.’ So Coleridge continues to speculate after 1818 on an ascent 
from physics to zoology to theology, wanting a quasi-material QED in the form of 
an evolution.8383. See note 40 above.View all notes But the problem here is 
philosophy. One of Schelling’s differences with Jacobi in 
the Pantheismusstreit had to do with Schelling’s belief that one could not have 
theology – the summit for Coleridge – without philosophy. Philosophy, Coleridge 
writes in a notebook entry that moves from the scale of nature to the scale of 
disciplines, is not a ‘Science; but a Supplement of Science,’ originating ‘in the 
feeling of a desideratum not supplied by any one Science’ nor the sciences 
collectively. ‘Supplement’ does not mean, as it does elsewhere, that philosophy 
is a handmaiden in the ‘realization’ of another science. Yet although philosophy 
here arises from a lack, Coleridge still wants to think it progressively, writing that 
it has three stages: ‘incipient, progressive, and conclusive or final.’8484. Ibid., 
4.4517, 4673.View all notes Nevertheless, it is the incipient that holds his 
attention, as a desideratum of ‘self-seeking’ rather than ‘self-finding,’ ‘a residuum 
of darkness common to all’ sciences.8585. Coleridge, Collected Letters, 6.599; 
and Notebooks, 4.4517 (cf. Collected Letters, 4.863).View all notes 
Thus Coleridge writes that if theology fails ‘in its professed Object’ of solving ‘the 
Problems left unsolved’ by lower sciences, including their ‘darkness or residua,’ 
its failure as ‘the Science of Sciences … gives rise to incipient Philosophy.’ We 
are not dealing here with a science ‘sink[ing]’ into a lower one, in order to be 
sublated back into a ‘circle’ as the lowest point is brought up to the ‘apex.’8686. 
Coleridge, Theory of Life, 519n.View all notesWe might expect such 
an Aufhebung, which Coleridge earlier in the entry attributes to the scale of 
nature. But since philosophy is not a science, though not entirely ‘heterogeneous’ 
to science, it cannot be sublated; it cannot simply be made the ‘transit from 
paganism to religion.’8787. Coleridge, History of Philosophy, 1.285–6.View all 
notes To adapt Foucault, philosophy is at once ‘essential and inessential–a 
border that is peripheral to the centre, but which never stops referring to and 
interrogating it.’8888. Coleridge, Notebooks, 4.4517; and Foucault, Introduction to 
Kant’s Anthropology, 120.View all notes Philosophy is the unsettling margin that 
accompanies every science which sees itself as progressing towards 
conclusiveness, yet always risks falling back into incipience. This ‘meta’ function 
does not make it the science of sciences, but rather means that it is the interior 
and residuum of all sciences because it always exceeds and cannot entirely be 
subsumed into other sciences. This is what we saw in TL when Coleridge added 
philosophy to the life sciences to make them progressive, but in the process 
elevated material details to the level of philosophical problems that resulted in the 
text falling back into incipience. It is also what he fears happening to theology. 
For although Coleridge also says that philosophy exists only when theology fails, 
and though he insists that theology is self-grounding because God is ‘the ground 
of its own existence,’ he ends by writing: ‘Thus, the failure of Theology … gives 
rise to incipient Philosophy’(emphasis mine).8989. See note 40 above.View all 
notes Buried somewhere in this entry is also Schelling’s profound complication in 
the Freedom essay of what it means for God to be self-grounding, namely that if 
God is the ground of (his) existence, then God contains the ground, and is in the 
ground of which he is the ground.9090. Ibid., 4.4728.View all notes For Schelling, 
too philosophy bears on ‘all things’ and so cannot be limited to being 
a Fachwissenschaft or defined subject.9191. Schelling, On University Studies, 79–
81.View all notes And it is as philosophy that ‘Schelling’ continues to haunt 
Coleridge. Apart from direct references to him, well after the ‘turn’ in 1818, the 
language of polarity, indifference, ground, powers, and copula is threaded 
through the Notebooks9292. For Coleridge’s continued reading of Schelling, 
see Notebooks, 4.4641, 4776, 4778, 4839 See 4538, 4641, 4663, 4776, 4784, 
4797, 4843, 4998, 5243, 5290, 5406, etc.View all notes and carries with it a 
residuum of darkness that draws Coleridge’s differences from Schelling, on 
which his natural and political theology are based, back into incipience. 
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